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Abstract 
Gradually, discussions about the mechanisms needed to achieve trust by consumers 
in e-business dealings are becoming more fine-grained.  One element that has 
attracted almost no attention to date is the signification of consent within 
telecommunications-based systems.  This paper examines the role of consent within 
the broader area of trust; identifies its dimensions;  proposes a framework within 
which e-consent services can be conceived, designed and developed;  and considers 
the scope for implementation. 
 
1. Introduction 
Consent means acquiescence, permission or agreement.  It can be approached as a 
question of human rights, of personal sovereignty, of self-determination and of 
ethics.  It has been examined from the perspective of political economy (e.g. 
Herman & Chomsky 1988), politics (e.g. Glasser & Salmon 1995), public 
economics (e.g. Buchanan & Tullock 1962), and health care decision-making (e.g. 
Annas 1998), as well as in more specific contexts such as drug trials, inoculation, 
sexual harassment, rape and euthanasia. 
This article examines the concept of consent, and applies it to the context of 
business generally, and especially to business conducted with the aid of electronic 
tools.  The Internet's promise is being achieved only very slowly, and lack of trust 
has been identified as a major factor.  Various aspects of trust have been examined 
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in the literature, including security and privacy.  Consent has seldom been the focus 
of such discussions, and this paper sets out to fill that gap. 
By e-business is meant all forms of electronic dealing among natural and legal 
persons, including e-commerce, e-government, e-publishing and electronic services 
delivery.  It is relevant to dealings among all combinations of individuals, small 
business enterprises, large business enterprises and government agencies. 
Consent is relevant in the business-to-business (B2B segment), but especially so in 
business-with-consumer Internet commerce (B2C).  One driver has been the gradual 
realisation by consumer marketing organisations that people like to at least have the 
impression that companies respect their interests, and their personal data.  Some 
corporations have gone further, and perceive competitive advantage from 'one-to-
one relationships' with individual consumers (Peppers & Rogers 1993), and in 
'permission-based marketing' as a means of improving relationships with their 
customers (e.g. MessageMedia 2001). 
During the second half of the twentieth century, most advanced jurisdictions have 
enacted consumer protection legislation, reflecting the imbalance of power between 
corporations and individuals.  In addition, most jurisdictions have, since about 
1970, enacted laws that formally recognise consumers' interests in data about 
themselves.  Many of these go so far as to impose some constraints on business 
activities, and to provide consumers with some legal rights.  Most of them explicitly 
refer to consent as a factor in the handling of personal data.  This substantial change 
in the relationships between individuals and organisations has arisen from a number 
of trends that were evident during the second half of the twentieth century,  Those 
trends include the following: 
• dealings between individuals and organisations are still increasing in their 
data-intensity, as organisations depend less and less on human contact and 
more and more on technology and computer-performed processes; 
• the forces of globalisation, including in recent years the Internet, are giving rise 
to a yet greater degree of alienation between people and the institutions that 
they have dealings with; 
• surveillance technologies are burgeoning, they are engendering consumer and 
citizen suspicion, and they are stimulating counter-measures;  
• the emergence of mobile business has brought with it convergence among 
Internet access devices, and increased the scope for organisations to perform 
person-identification, person-location and person-tracking Clarke (1999e);  
and 
• new generations of net-consumers may have been at least partly infected with 
the cyberculture ethos.  If so, they are likely to utilise the Internet's potentials 
in order to form much more powerful and effective consumer coalitions than 




This paper commences by briefly surveying the concept of trust.  It then examines 
the nature and dimensions of consent as a means of inculcating trust.  This is 
followed by consideration of consent in the context of open public networks and e-
business. A generic e-consent process is presented, the concept of an 'e-consent 
object' is introduced, and implementation possibilities are discussed. 
 
2. Trust 
When one party is dependent on the behaviour of another, uncertainties exist, which 
give rise to risks.  In the physical world, risk-management techniques are 
institutionalised, and who bears which residual risks is reasonably well-known.  
Large organisations may seek to exercise their market power over relatively weak 
individuals and small business enterprises.  In civilised countries, consumer 
protection laws provide some degree of counterbalance against such abuses of 
market power. 
With the advent of marketspaces, new uncertainties have arisen, and new balances 
have to be sought.  The other party is more difficult to identify and locate, and 
hence to pursue when things go wrong.  Information provided is not easy to 
authenticate.  The challenges are compounded by the manner in which cyberspace 
challenges conventional geographical jurisdictions. 
With transactions in physical space, and even more so in electronic space, each 
party needs to tolerate some residual risks inherent in transactions.  The notion of 
trust involves having confidence in the other parties, and hence having an 
expectation that the risks mostly will not result in loss.  A useful working definition 
of trust is "confident reliance by one party about the behaviour of other 
parties". 
The origins of the trust are in family and social settings, and the concept is tightly 
bound up with cultural affinities and inter-dependencies.  Trust in the context of 
business, on the other hand, is not grounded in culture, but is merely what a party 
has to depend on when no other form of risk amelioration strategy is available. 
Trust can be based on a direct relationship between the parties (such as a contract, 
or prior transactions);  or on experience (such as a prior transaction, vicarious 
experience, or a trial transaction).  When such relatively strong sources of trust are 
unavailable, it may be necessary to rely on 'referred trust', such as 'word-of-mouth', 
reputation, delegated contractual arrangements, or accreditation by some body 
considered to be itself reputable.  The weakest bases for trust are mere brandnames, 
and meta-brands such as 'seals of approval' from organisations that are no better-
known than the company they purport to be attesting to (Clarke 2001d).  
Examinations of trust include Gambetta (1988), Doney & Cannon (1997), Hoffman 
et al. (1999), Tan & Thoen W. (2000), Friedman et al. (2000), Schneiderman 
(2000), Koehn (2001), Cook (2001), Solomon & Flores (2001) and Clarke (2001h). 
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In the context of B2C, many organisations have carried over the 'consumer as prey' 
attitudes prevalent in the 'mass marketing' and 'direct marketing' eras.  This is 
evidenced by successive failed or failing initiatives, such as billboards on the 
information superhighway (1994-95), closed electronic communities (1995-97), 
push technologies (1996-98), spam (1996-), infomediaries (1996-99), portals (1998-
2000) and surreptitious data capture (1999-).  These are examined in Clarke (1997a, 
1997b, 1998a, 1998d, 1999a, 1999c). 
Consumers continue to lack confidence in Internet commerce, and growth is slow.  
Examinations of various aspects of B2C, and guidelines on how to overcome the 
disastrous start to the B2C era, are offered in Clarke (2001a, 2001c, and 2001g).  
Central to these proposals to inculcate trust are the notions of consumer choice, 
permission-based marketing, and information provision to consumers in order to 
enable choice.  Yet to date there has been far too little consideration of the concept 
and dynamics of consent. 
 
3. Consent 
In some circumstances, consent is irrelevant, because legal authority exists.  In 
other circumstances, one party (usually the corporation) has sufficient market power 
that it can safely ignore the interests of the other (usually the consumer), and coerce 
their behaviour (Clarke 2001e).   
On the other hand, even in the relatively laissez faire environment of the U.S.A., 
B2C activities are subject to some degree of regulation.  One source is contract law, 
which enables the parties to define the undertakings each enters into, and to specify 
the terms of the agreement (subject to some terms that are implied).  Many 
jurisdictions also provide explicit consumer protection laws, to reflect the disparity 
in the power relationships. 
In many circumstances, however, consent is significant as a means of inculcating 
trust.  Moreover, it was discovered to be so some years ago, e.g.:  "consumers want 
full disclosure, full consent, opt-in" (Novak et al. 1997).  
The following sub-sections examine the concept, contexts and characteristics of 
consent.  Because of the paucity of experience in business and especially in e-
business, the discussion draws ideas from sources in areas where the concept is far 
better developed, in particular health care settings. 
 
3.1 Definition 
Dictionaries offer a wide array of meanings if the term 'consent'.  An inspection of 
statutory law in which the term is used, on the other hand, locates few formal 
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definitions.  Drawing together the elements that are apparent from the various 
sources, a working definition of consent is "concurrence by a party with an action to 
be taken by another party". 
The basic concept appears to be generally independent of such questions as whether 
the concurrence is offered by the party giving it, or procured by the other party;  
whether the agreement is spontaneous, or is influenced by the other party;  whether 
or not the party acquiring the consent offers inducements;  and whether any 
inducements offered are of the nature of a reward or a penalty. 
 
3.2 Contexts 
Consent has relevance in a wide variety of contexts.  Some are at a high level of 
abstraction, as in the (often tacit) consent that citizens give to governments to define 
and implement social policy, and to engage in acts of war.  That kind of consent is 
not further considered in this paper. 
Still mostly outside the domain of e-business, but more closely related, is consent 
by individuals to actions in relation to their person.  Because this is a primary 
source of the available practical experience with consent, this paper pays 
considerable attention to it.  Contexts include: 
• medical procedures.  The individual's consent is generally a pre-requisite to 
interventions such as the prescription of drugs, inoculation, and surgery; 
• acquisition and use of organs, body tissue and body fluids.  Generally, the 
removal of body parts, tissue and fluid from live people (e.g. donations of 
kidneys, bone marrow, blood and semen) is treated as a medical procedure.  
The removal of body parts and tissue from corpses is also in many countries 
predicated upon the consent of the individual given before death, or of next-of-
kin given after death.  In some countries, on the other hand, a deniable 
presumption of consent exists (including Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, 
Italy, Spain and Switzerland - see Wolfslast 1992);  and 
• acquisition and testing of body tissue and body fluids.  Body tissue and 
body fluids are also used for diagnostics for health care purposes, and for 
substance abuse testing for law enforcement, for sporting regulation, and in 
some employment contexts.   With exceptions authorised by law, the 
acquisition, and the testing, generally require the consent of the individual 
concerned. 
 
A considerable body of law, policy and procedure exists, to regulate the manner in 
which the individual's agreement to such actions is acquired by health care 
professionals, law enforcement agencies, and where applicable such other parties as 
morgues and employers. 
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This existing body of law, policy and practice needs to be borne in mind when the 
diverse range of B2C e-business activities is considered, including such contexts as: 
• promotion and marketing; 
• contract terms and conditions; 
• payments;  and 
• the handling of consumers' personal data. 
 
In their consumer marketing practices, marketers commonly assume that they 
have an economically-justified right to invade the privacy of customers', prospects' 
and suspects' physical mail-boxes and email-boxes, and to intrude into their quiet 
enjoyment of their homes by calling them on the phone.  Many consumers, on the 
other hand, assert that each of these practices should be permitted only with the 
individual's consent. 
Under contract law, the terms and conditions that are applied to a transaction  need 
to be offered, and accepted.  Usually at least some aspects are likely to be expressly 
offered and accepted, although the courts might impute conventional terms of trade 
in any particular industry sector, and are very likely to regard some terms as being 
implied.  In e-business contexts, explicit consent is conventionally achieved by the 
consumer clicking on an 'I accept' button in a web-form.  An area of difficulty is the 
lack of consumer choice in such circumstances, because the only choice that exists 
is for the consumer to accept the fixed terms and conditions or not do business. 
A further context is the transfer of funds from a consumer to a corporation.  The 
dominant mechanism in Internet commerce is the use of credit card details to effect 
payment.  In many cases, corporations do not merely use card details once and 
immediately delete them from their files, but rather store them in case there are 
subsequent transactions.  This is not just a matter of convenience (avoiding re-
keying and the associated risk of error), but also of security (avoiding further 
exposure of the details on an insecure medium such as email). 
On the other hand, there is a problem of security of the details in the hands of the 
corporation, because the corporation itself, or its employees, might use them to 
generate further charges against the card.  The question arises as to whether and 
how the consumer signifies consent for the first use of the details, for the retention 
of the details, and for subsequent uses of the details;  whether and how the 
consumer discovers that any such actions have been taken without consent;  and 
what recourse the consumer has when inappropriate actions have been taken. 
Another crucial context is consumer data management by corporations, including 
its collection, its use, and its disclosure.  Attention was drawn above to the tension 
between consumer and marketer perspectives concerning access to the individual's 
letter-box, telephone and e-mailbox.  A similar tension exists in relation to personal 
data, because many consumer marketing companies treat it as though it were 
appropriable by them, for any purpose that suits them, at their choice. 
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Consumers are increasingly expecting, and demanding, less cavalier attitudes.  
Early data privacy laws in such countries as Sweden and Germany gave rise to the 
OECD's 1980 Guidelines.  Most advanced western nations have enacted laws that 
regulate both public and private sector uses of personal data, and all have been 
heavily influenced by the OECD code.  It is a limited form of protection that is 
commonly referred to as the 'fair information practices' model.  The European 
Union has recently tightened its requirements, and declared its intention to protect 
its citizens' data against export to countries that do not provide equivalent 
protections (EU 1995).  Some specific abuses are currently being singled out for 
attention, including spam and inappropriate use of cookies.  
Alone among the economically advanced nations, the U.S. has resisted the 
enactment of a general law protecting consumers against the privacy-invasive 
practices of corporations, even though it has a vast array of context-specific 
legislation (Smith 2001, EPIC 2001).  The combination of pressure from the 
European Union and the lack of trust by consumers has made it inevitable that some 
form of legal protections will be created and enforced (Clarke 1999b). 
In 'fair information practices' laws, consent is important in several ways.  In relation 
to data collection, they say that "The knowledge or consent of the data subject is as 
a rule essential ..." (OECD 1980, Collection Limitation Principle and para. 52).  In 
addition, it is a vital means whereby limitations on use and disclosure of data are 
defined (Use Limitation Principle and para. 55). 
Some kinds of consumer data are widely regarded as being particularly sensitive.  
Many organisations claim the need for access to health consumer data, despite the 
strong interests of individuals, and their claimed moral and even legal rights.  
Severe tensions exist between personal interests, those of other parties such as 
researchers and investigators, and in some cases the general public interest.  In 
relation to the testing of body tissue and body fluids, for example, explicit consents 
may be needed for acquisition of the sample, for each test performed on the sample, 
for retention of the sample, for any re-testing of the sample, for the use of data 
arising from each test, for disclosure of data arising from each test, for retention of 
data arising from each test, and for the association of an identifier or pseudo-
identifier with each sample and each item of data arising from each test. 
Health consumer data intersects with B2C e-business, in that health care services 
are increasingly being conducted on the net, and health insurers are increasingly 
endeavouring to intrude themselves into the health care process.  
At least the more affluent consumers generally regard protections relating to 
taxation and financial data as especially important.  Another matter of 
considerable sensitivity is data that has historically been associated with severe 
prejudice, such as gender, marital status, ethnicity and sexual preferences.  For 
a proportion of the population, date and place of birth are private matters, and the 
demands of organisations for that data are a source of considerable embarrassment. 
 Concerns also arise in relation to household data.  For example, the recording of 
gender and date-of-birth in such databases as electoral rolls can enable the ready 
identification of households without an adult male. 
eConsent: A Critical Element of Trust in eBusiness 
 345
3.3 Characteristics 
A working definition of 'consent' was provided above.  This sub-section submits the 
concept to more detailed examination.  The organisation of this sub-section, and a 
reasonable proportion of the analysis, are original, because relevant literature is 
somewhat sparse and difficult to locate.  See, however, Buchanan & Tullock 
(1962), Faden & Beauchamp (1986) and Hartnett (2000). 
A critical issue is what constitutes evidence of consent.  A range of possibilities 
exists.  The most formal and reliable is 'express consent', where the individual 
provides explicit signification that they have granted it.  Express consent may be 
'consent in writing' (including other recorded form, such as an email, or a tick in a 
box on a web-form).  Consent may, however, be given in a manner that gives rise to 
no record (in particular, verbal or visual approval).  The evidence in such instances 
is the recipient's notes, or memory, of the act of signification.  See Bygrave (1998) 
for an explanation of the manner in which the German Teleservices Data Protection 
Act (Teledienstedatenschutzgesetz) of 1997 provides for teleservice users to be able 
to declare their consent electronically. 
Weaker forms of evidence are available.  The term 'implied consent' is useful to 
refer to circumstances in which an individual's action (or perhaps inaction) 
reasonably causes another party to interpret consent as having been granted.  For 
example, a person may provide information in a context in which it is clear that the 
information will be used for some purpose, or will be disclosed to some other 
person, e.g. a delivery address may need to be disclosed by a merchant to a courier 
company. 
Unfortunately, the term 'implied consent' is also often used to encompass another, 
rather different circumstance.  This is where a party infers from the context that the 
individual has given consent, but the inference is unreasonable or at least readily 
contestable.  This is much more usefully described as 'inferred consent'. 
A further circumstance arises where the law creates a presumption that consent 
exists unless it is expressly over-ridden by the person concerned.  In such cases, a 
person needs to be able to declare a denial of consent.  This may also be express 
(in which case it involves a signification that may or may not give rise to a record), 
or it may be implied, or inferred. 
To be effective, the act of consent needs to satisfy a number of conditions.  An 
apparently valid consent may be found to be ineffective if the person does not have 
the legal capacity to give one.  Considerable bodies of law relate to limitations on 
the capacity of children, people whose intellectual capacity is significantly 
impaired, the comatose, and the deceased. 
Another requirement is for 'informed consent', by which is meant that, for consent 
to be meaningful, the individual needs to understand its implications.  See Hartnett 
(2000) for a treatment of the topic in the health care context.  A consent must be 
specific and bounded.  In particular, it must be clear from the expression, or at least 
from the context: 
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• what action(s) the consent authorises.  This requires reasonable specificity in 
relation to, or example, the use of credit card details, and of the items of data it 
encompasses, from whom they are to be collected, by whom they are to be 
used, and to whom they are permitted to be disclosed; 
• to whom the authorisation is provided.  For example, is it given to a particular 
company, or merely a business unit within it, or also to related companies;  and 
what happens in the event of a merger or takeover; 
• for what purpose(s) the authorisation applies.  Considerable difficulties arise 
from generalised expressions of purpose, such as a government agency stating 
'for the performance of the agency's functions', and a company declaring 
'marketing of goods and services';  and 
• over what time-period it operates. 
 
A further criterion used to judge whether a consent is effective is 'freely-given 
consent'.  This implies that no legal compulsion, duress, coercion or undue 
influence must be involved.  There may, however, be inducements, or a quid pro 
quo.  Indeed, contract law requires consideration to be provided by both parties as a 
pre-condition to the formation of a contract (and hence to the existence of a 
consent). 
Additional vital features are the revocability and variability of consent, by the 
individual who gave it.  Issues arise regarding the communication of the variation 
or revocation, and the notice required for it to take effect. 
A further characteristic is the delegability of the power to consent.  Relevant areas 
of law include guardianship, e.g. by persons in loco parentis, and powers of 
attorney.  Particular challenges arise with the inference of power of attorney for the 
comatose, and especially for persons deemed to be 'brain-dead', and with 'enduring' 
or 'durable' powers of attorney, which are not voided by the person losing their legal 
capacity, e.g. as a result of senile dementia.  Aspects that are relevant to B2B 
include the powers of directors and officers, and principal-agent relationships.  
Directly relevant to the B2C segment are procedures for persons who are too young 
to enter into an enforceable contract. 
It is easy for a corporation to assert, or to simply assume, that it has the concurrence 
of a consumer to an action it proposes to take.  This section has shown how difficult 
it can be to actually have that consent.  Genuine permission-based marketing, 
contracting, payment and data-handling pose considerable challenges.  The 
following sections consider how permission-based marketing can be enabled in the 
e-business context. 
 
eConsent: A Critical Element of Trust in eBusiness 
 347 
4. e-Consent 
In e-business, a variety of circumstances exists in which one party wishes to 
provide consent, and it is only natural that the consent be provided using the same 
information infrastructure that supports the rest of the transaction.  It would be 
unlikely that trust could be achieved by means of inferred, implied, or even express-
but-unrecorded signification of consent.  In the electronic context, express-in-
'writing' signification is needed, in order to provide clear evidence.  The following 
working definition is proposed:  e-consent is "signification by recorded electronic 
means of concurrence or otherwise with an action to be taken by another 
party". 
Consent is related to authentication.  Authentication is commonly presumed to 
mean 'authentication of identity';  but this is not necessarily the case:  
authentication is a process whereby a degree of confidence in an assertion is 
established (Clarke 2001i).  In some circumstances, the assertion is that a party has 
a particular identity, but in others the assertion relates to value, or to an attribute of 
a party, and not to the party's identity.  The form of assertion to be authenticated 
that is relevant to this paper is '<a particular party> consents to <a particular 
action>'. 
Consent is also related to authorisation, or privileges.  This is conventionally used 
within computing systems to refer to a permission to access a resource such as 
particular data or a particular process.  The permission may be based on legal 
authority, or power, or consent.  The absence of permission may result in access to 
the resource being denied, or qualified;  or in some additional action being taken, 
such as recording of the action taken and/or notification to some process or person 
performing a control role.  
In order to facilitate trust in e-business, an e-consent mechanism needs to enable the 
following: 
• declaration of the person's wishes; 
• expression in some kind of record;  and either 
o structured display of the consent to the recipient;  or 
o programmatic protection of one of two kinds: 
! the prevention of access unless the specified conditions 
are satisfied (which is normally implied by the 
expressions 'authorisation' and 'access control');  or 
! less absolute protection, such as by the provision of access 
only after an explicit warning is displayed.  This has 
application in the health care sector, where the ability for 
health carers to override access rules is important in order 
to enable the treatment of critically ill patients.  Equally, 
however, controls are needed over abuses of the 
privileges, including education and training, warnings, 
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logging, exception-reporting of accesses, sanctions against 
abuses, and action against miscreants.  It is not clear that 
this looser form of protection is appropriate in the B2C 
context. 
An e-consent scheme must offer acceptable levels of security.  Security refers to 
both a condition in which harm does not arise, despite the occurrence of threatening 
events, and a set of safeguards designed to achieve that condition.  Threatening 
events are variously natural, accidental and intentional, and harm can be to persons, 
property, value, or reputation.  Information security encompasses the whole of an 
information system, including organisational and individual behaviour, and manual 
elements of the overall system, as well as computing and communications aspects. 
Moreover, security is important throughout the information life-cycle, i.e. during 
the collection, storage, processing, use and disclosure phases, and not merely the 
transmission phase so often focussed on in technical discussions of security.  A 
comprehensive security strategy comprises a suite of inter-related safeguards 
structured in a hierarchical fashion, and dealing with infrastructure, threat 
management, vulnerability management, and application-specific security.  
There is also a vital need for compatibility with existing infrastructure.  This 
includes workstations, hosts, and local and wide-area networks;  and protocols such 
as smtp/pop for email, ftp for file transfer, and http for fetching web-pages and 
submitting data via web-forms.   
In addition, an e-Consent scheme needs to satisfy the following, more specific 
requirements: 
• the scheme must exhibit service integrity, to ensure availability, reliability, 
completeness and promptness; 
• each facility supporting participants in the system needs to be able to: 
o authenticate the identifier and/or attributes of other facilities;  and 
o provide their identifier and/or attributes in such a manner that they can be 
authenticated by other facilities; 
• data (including consent/denial, data that the consent applies to, and agent 
identifiers and attributes) needs to exhibit the following properties: 
o data integrity, to ensure that data is authentic, reliable, complete, 
unaltered and useable, and that the processes that operate on data are 
reliable, legally compliant, comprehensive, systematic, and protective of 
data; 
o data access control, to ensure that it is only available to those who 
should have it; 
o authentication, to ensure that appropriate checks are performed on data, 
identity and attributes;  and 
o non-repudiation, to ensure that entities cannot convincingly deny 
important actions they have taken;  and 
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• the act of creating a consent needs to satisfy the following conditions:  
o be provided by a person with the mental capacity to do so; 
o be provided by a person with the legal capacity to do so in respect of that 
action or data; 
o be express;  or possibly reasonably implied, or (with great care) inferred, 
but in such a manner that an opportunity exists for the implied or inferred 
consent to be denied; 
o be informed; 
o be freely-given; 
o be specific and bounded; 
o be signified in a manner that provides evidence; 
o be non-repudiable (preventing the denial that the consent was given);  and 
• be variable and revocable, by means of a further transaction that satisfies all of 
the same conditions. 
 
A comprehensive strategy is needed to ensure that the requirements are satisfied.  
Such a strategy needs to comprise: 
• an architecture that provides a framework within which a cohesive set of 
safeguards can be devised and implemented; 
• a process, to ensure that the strategy is articulated into a plan, and the plan 
implemented; 
• protocols and standards to enable reliable interactions over public networks; 
• tools and tool-kits to enable cost-effective and reliable implementation;  and 
• resources, to enable the design to be implemented. 
 
This may seem to be a considerable set of requirements, and to be elaborate, costly 
or inconvenient to consumer marketing corporations.  On the other hand, the 
provision of such facilities may prove to be a pre-condition for trust in e-business, 
and hence simply 'a cost of doing business'. 
 
5. The e-Consent Process 
An e-Consent scheme requires secure and reliable capture, communication and 
utilisation of the consent, among relevant human actors and their software agents.  




A context exists within which a process to produce a consent is initiated (process 1 
in Exhibit 1).  The initiation may be by either the person themselves or some other 
party, and may comprise a single step or an interactive process.  Consent is then 
declared by the person concerned, using a computing facility, which comprises a 
computer with requisite systems software and application software (process 2).  The 
consent is expressed in an e-consent object that enables it to be communicated to 
other parties (3).  This may be by means of the transmission of a message to another 
party, or its storage in an accessible database or directory (4). 
Either by receiving a message, or accessing the relevant database or directory, the e-
consent object reaches a computing facility that is under the control of a person or 
application software.  The consent may be subjected to some form of authentication 
(5).  It may then be applied in some manner (6).  Appropriate actions include a 
person reading it, or software using it to permit or deny access to a particular 
resource, or to warn a person about the lack of consent, or existence of a denial, 
relating to their permission to access a particular resource. 
The e-consent object is conceptually distinct from the information that it refers to.  
The information itself could be included in the same message, or transmitted 

















Exhibit 1: The e-Consent Process 
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6. An e-Consent Object 
The previous section identified the need for an e-consent object, as a means of 
encapsulating the data that defines the consent, together with any processes closely 
related to that data.  This section provides an outline of what such an object needs to 
contain.  A considerable number of data-items is involved, within a structure rather 
more complex than a simple list. 
The purpose of the e-consent object is to provide a recipient with evidence of the 
consent, and to instruct a recipient as to what the implications of the consent are.  A 
generic model of an e-consent object is an assertion of the following form: 
Access to <information> 
by <one or more entities or identities, or classes thereof> 
for <one or more purposes> 
in <a context> 
is [consented to | denied] 
by <an identity> 
The information to which the consent relates might be designated by reference to 
one or more named objects, or as a set of data-items.  In many contexts, definitions 
of the domains over which data-items are defined will also be challenging, 
especially in relation to the classes of entities. 
In some circumstances, supplementary data may need to be supported.  For 
example, where an agent acts on behalf of the individual, relevant data needs to be 
recorded about the agent, the power of attorney, and the circumstances.  It may also 
be necessary to record the means whereby the person signified consent, and the date 
and time of expiry of the consent. 
A consent clause may be subject to qualifications.  For example, access might be 
granted to a general class of entity, but excluding some specific instance (e.g. all 
insurance companies except a particular one);  and purpose might be expressed as 
the marketing of any of the company's goods and services except prophylactics.  
There may be multiple qualifications at each level.  Hence the e-Consent object 
needs to support: 
• a broadly-expressed consent; 
• qualified by one or more specific denials;  and 
• a broadly-expressed denial; 
• qualified by one or more specific consents. 
The object needs to support a hierarchy of qualifications.  An example drawn 
from the health care context is that a patient may: 
• consent to the availability of all information to all health carers;  but 
• within that, deny all information relating to HIV/AIDS;  but 
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• within that, consent to information relating to HIV/AIDS 
to be available to STD clinics;  and finally 
• within that, deny all information to a specific 
STD clinic (where Aunt Rosie works). 
For revocation purposes, and to resolve disputes, an e-Consent object needs to 
contain date-time stamps that record when it was created and communicated, and 
this would need to be reliable and subject to authentication procedures. 
Hence considerable care is needed in devising a data structure to support the e-
consent object.  Once again, this might be considered to be elaborate, costly, or 
inconvenient to the consumer marketing organisation;  but it might well be a cost of 
doing B2C e-business. 
 
7. Current Implementations of e-Consent  
This paper has introduced the concept of e-consent, and proposed definitions, a 
process, and an object to encapsulate it.  This section considers whether e-consent 
has been effectively implemented to date. 
Some conventional web-site techniques are relevant.  The most common is the 
presentation of terms of contract on a web-page, with an 'I accept' button that the 
consumer must click on in order to continue with the purchasing process.  This 
inverts the expression of consent, because the statement is entirely pre-determined 
by the organisation seeking the consent.  In many cases, the process fails against the 
criteria of being informed and freely-given consent.  Various problems arise in 
relation to the power of the individual to provide the consent (e.g. lack of evidence 
that the person is not a minor).   
The concept of 'info-mediaries' was introduced some years ago, to act as agents for 
collectives of individuals, and to interface on their behalf with consumer marketing 
organisations (Hagel & Rayport 1996, Hagel & Armstrong 1997).  Notionally, these 
could be implemented using software agent technology.  In practice, however, there 
is little evidence of info-mediaries actually emerging. 
What has emerged is initiatives designed from the opposite direction, i.e. to serve 
the interests of consumer marketing organisations rather than those of consumers.  
An early proposal was Microsoft's Open Profiling Standard (OPS) which has given 
way to the company's generalised login scheme Passport and its associated 
centrally-stored 'wallet'.  Competitor projects include AOL's Screen Name, 
AOL/Netscape's Quick Checkout, and the Liberty Alliance. 
These initiatives, which are sometimes referred to as 'identity management' 
schemes, are strongly pro-marketer, evidence very limited involvement of consumer 
interests, are concerned primarily with the acquisition of approval from consumers, 
and give very little attention to specific, informed and freely-given consent, or even 
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security.  For resources on the serious privacy-invasiveness of Microsoft's XP, 
.NET, Passport and wallet products and the intended Hailstorm / MyServices 
mechanism for web-services, see EPIC (2000-).  Early in the second quarter of 
2002, Microsoft switched its emphasis on MyServices from a Redmond-based 
service to a product to be sold to consumer marketing corporations.  This is only a 
very marginal improvement in a parlous scheme. 
A relevant protocol that originally held great promise is W3C's Platform for Privacy 
Preferences (P3P).  The e-consent aspects of the protocol were still-born, however, 
and P3P is merely a means for web-sites to publish their privacy statements in a 
machine-readable format (Clarke 1998b, 1998c, 2001b).  Extensions to P3P may 
emerge, which would enable it to graduate from a mere 'privacy policy publication 
protocol' to a genuinely privacy-protective software agent technology;  but at 
present this seems unlikely. 
 
8. Implementation Prospects 
If e-consent is not currently implemented in a satisfactory manner, what more 
appropriate approaches are available?  The following sub-sections examine each of 
the phases identified in Exhibit 1 above as being the elements of a comprehensive 
e-consent scheme. 
8.1   Initiation 
An organisation may commence a process by contacting a consumer, e.g. with an 
offer to sell goods or services.  Alternatively, a consumer may initiate.  In some 
circumstances, an organisation is likely to declare that some aspects of the consent 
are non-negotiable.  This is problematical, however, where the organisation has a 
monopoly, or the practices across an industry-sector are standardised rather than 
competitive.  Mere recitation by the organisation of the fixed and pre-determined 
form of consent it requires does very little to inculcate trust.  There would be 
considerable advantages if the process were capable of being interactive, to enable 
customisation of an e-consent object appropriate to the particular context.  Hence 
interaction between the facilities of the consumer and the marketer is at least 
beneficial and possibly necessary.   
The consumer and the marketer facilities need to have application software that use 
a common protocol (perhaps implemented in a web-browser plug-in and a web-
server script, or by means of a web-form and/or an email-interchange).  W3C's P3P 
protocol, although limited, does offer a means whereby an organisation can express 
its privacy policies in machine-readable form. 
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8.2   Declaration of Consent 
The consumer could declare their agreement to the terms on their own computing 
facility, using email or a web-browser.  The e-consent object could be created by 
either facility, provided that the contents and their implications were clear to the 
consumer, and not agreed to under duress, and hence consent was signified 
effectively. 
If the consumer facility has the capability, the e-consent object could be digitally 
signed (preferably using a separate and secure token, such as a smartcard).  Very 
few facilities used by consumers have such capabilities, however.  In the absence of 
a smartcard and means to connect it, a less secure but workable arrangement would 
be for the consumer to indicate agreement to a consent form that replicates the 
contents of the e-consent object in a human-readable format.  This could be 
displayed or printed, e.g. as a generated web-page, email or PDF document, and a 
copy retained on the consumer's facility.   
The consumer's identity could be authenticated by keying a password / PIN / 
passphrase (or, if the importance warranted the trouble and expense, by signing and 
then mailing or faxing a printed version).  In the physical world, organisations 
undertake limited authentication, and in many cases only do so where the matter is 
sensitive, or some grounds for suspicion of masquerade exists.  A similar approach 
might be in many cases quite adequate in the digital world as well. 
Other alternatives exist.  A marketer might prepare an e-consent object on the basis 
of consent-related information already held on file.  And circumstances exist in 
which the consumer is physically present in the office of the marketer or of an agent 
(such as a solicitor, accountant, financial adviser or health care professional).  In 
such cases, the consumer can signify consent by such means as a signature on an 
office-copy of the printed document, or a keystroke on a computing facility within 
that office. 
8.3 Expression in an e-Consent Object 
The information needs to be expressed in an e-consent object that enables it to be 
communicated to other parties.  An outline of such an object was provided in 
section 6 above.  The object could be transmitted in a message, or stored as an entry 
in a database or directory. 
If it is expressed as a message-format, then a candidate means for defining the 
format would be EDIFACT.  In the present e-business context, however, XML 
would be a much more appropriate meta-language.  If it is expressed as a database 
record, then various, mainly proprietary alternatives exist, but XML would be the 
preferable meta-language. 
The information in an e-consent object is itself privacy-sensitive, and potentially 
highly so.  Access to it therefore needs to be subject to security protections.  This 
suggests that access controls need to be defined, and it may need to be stored in 
encrypted form on the consumer's facility, on the marketer's facility, on any other 
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facility that it may reside in, whether temporarily or long-term, and in any database 
or directory service. 
8.4 Transmission of the e-Consent Object 
For the e-consent object to be used, it must be communicated to other relevant 
facilities.  Transmission security possibilities include the use of virtual private 
networks (VPNs), channel-encryption measures such as SSL/TLS, and message-
encryption tools such as PGP. 
8.5 Authentication of the e-Consent 
The e-consent object may be subjected to some form of authentication.  It is a large 
cluster of assertions, and it would need to be assessed which, if any, need to be 
checked. 
The possibility exists of applying public key cryptography;  but there are serious 
shortcomings in conventional approaches (Clarke 2001f, 2001j).  The possibility 
also exists of applying smartcards or similar tokens, combined with passwords, 
PINs or passphrases, and perhaps biometrics. 
Arrangements that may be less secure, but would certainly be less costly and more 
practicable, might be based on tokens bearing printed data, embossed data, bar-
codes and/or data encoded into magnetic stripes.  All such schemes require the issue 
and management of tokens, and authentication procedures to ensure they are not 
issued inappropriately.  But they also require token-readers deployed in all relevant 
locations, which has to date represented a serious barrier.  
As discussed in sub-section 8.2 above, simple userid/password pair techniques are 
currently the most sophisticated mechanism supported by mainstream computing 
facilities;  and in some cases the individual granting the consent will not have an 
account, and may only be able to signify consent by indirect means.  
8.6 Application of the e-Consent 
The e-consent object needs to be applied to its purpose.  One simple approach is for 
the contents of the e-consent object to be displayed to the person who seeks to take 
the relevant action.  That person can then make a judgement as to whether or not 
they are permitted access. 
This approach is insecure.  In order to rein in abuses, controls would be important.  
The system could warn about the consequences of unauthorised access.  Accesses 
could be logged, the logs routinely analysed, and exceptions reported in batch-mode 
or in real time to some monitor function (a person or a software agent).  To be 
credible, such mechanisms need to lead to investigations of exceptions, and to the 
imposition of effective sanctions on those who abuse the privilege. 
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Such an approach would be considerably superior to the present very lax situation, 
and could be cost-effective in many circumstances in which the data is not overly 
sensitive, the access policies are provisional, or the consequences of false-rejection 
might be much higher than those of false-acceptance.  Examples include manual 
overrides on dangerous equipment (such as chemical processes and fly-by-wire 
aircraft), and access to a patient's health care data in critical treatment contexts. 
Much greater security is achieved where a system uses the e-consent object to 
permit or deny access to information.  This is the function of access control 
(including role-based access control – RBAC), and is sometimes referred to as an 
'authorisation' process, or a 'gatekeeper' function.  See Weber (1999, pp. 378-391). 
8.7 A Simple Implementation 
An example of a straightforward, practicable implementation is as follows: 
• the marketer communicates the terms and conditions, or their requirements for 
personal information, by means of a web-page and/or in structured form; 
• the consumer uses their computing facility to declare the consent they are 
prepared to provide, and to create an e-consent object.  The consumer's facility 
might use an independent piece of software or a browser plug-in, together with 
a management tool for personal data and consents, perhaps combined with 
templates provided by a consumer or privacy association; 
• the consumer uses their computing facility, together with adequately secure 
means such as SSL/TLS, to transmit the e-consent object to the marketer; 
• the marketer's facility examines the e-consent object, to determine whether it 
satisfies the marketer's requirements.  In the absence of an adequate protocol 
and tools, the inspection would be manual; 
• if an agreement has been reached, the marketer's facility signifies this to the 
consumer's facility, and the marketer proceeds with the actions consented to by 
the consumer.  Alternatively, the marketer declines the offer, or formulates and 
transmits a counter-proposal. 
 
9. Conclusions 
Consumers continue to be untrusting of Internet commerce, and the behaviour of e-
marketers gives them every reason to stay that way.  Trust in e-business would be 
greatly facilitated by a mechanism that enables consumers to express the terms of 
their consent, and to communicate that to other parties.  This requires maturation 
beyond old-fashioned 'consumer-as-prey' marketing philosophies, and inversion of 
current thinking about 'identity management' and marketer-controlled declaration of 
terms and conditions, and storage of and control over personal data.  
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The purpose of this paper has been to contribute to the emergence of e-consent 
mechanisms.  It has done so by examining the notion of consent in some depth;  
describing the process whereby e-consent can be declared, expressed, 




The clarification of my ideas in relation to e-consent has taken place during the 
course of a lengthy project on its application to coordinated care, undertaken for the 
Australian Department of Health in Canberra.  The project was conceived by Peter 
Broadhead, together with John Payne and team-members Jane Spittle and Kylie 
Jonasson.  Other consultants involved in the project whose work has contributed to 
the framework have been Enrico Coiera of UNSW in Sydney and Christine O'Keefe 
of CSIRO in Melbourne.  Of course, the ideas in this paper do not necessarily 
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